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EPITAPH FOR PARDON BASED ON THE PURPOSE OF PUNISHMENT
Eoa Carracedo Carrasco'
A. INTRODUCTION. CONCEPTUAL
DELINEATION OF THE INDIVIDUAL PARDON
The objective of this article is to analyze
the purposes assigned to "the pardon" as an in-
stitution based on the different theories of jus-
tification of punishment. Its ultimate goal is to
reflect on its justification in modern criminal
law in the framework of democratic rule of law.
To do this, it is necessary to start with the con-
cept of the individual pardon.
In general terms, "pardon" could be de-
fined as a discretionary act that, for a specific
case, involves the mitigation or elimination of
unfavorable legal consequences meted out in
accordance with the law.2
In the face of the silence maintained by
the Spanish Constitution and legislation, "in-
dividual pardon" can be defined as the discre-
tionary act derived from the power nominally
conferred to the Head of State.3 The pardon
power was materialized as an act of the Gov-
ernment, endorsed and proposed by the Min-
ister of Justice and following the deliberation
of the Council of Ministers. In application, the
sentence already imposed in a final judgment
is not fully enforced, with it being partially or
totally reduced or commuted to a less serious
one.s
A pardon entails that, at the discretion
of the Executive, a penalty is either partially
or totally not enforced according to the exten-
sion established by the Royal Decree; or it is
replaced with a lesser one.6
B. PURPOSES ASSIGNED TO THE INSTITUTION
OF THE PARDON: INTRODUCTION.
REGUIATIVE AND PRACTICAL CONTEXT OF
THE PARDON'S ROYAL DECREES
Not only does the Spanish Constitution
not define the particular pardon, but, as is often
the case in comparative law, neither is there an
indication of the reasons, requirements or req-
uisites for it to be granted.
Postdoctoral researcher in Criminal Law and PhD in Law and Political Science, Universidad Aut6noma de Madrid (Spain).
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2; C.E., B.O.E. n. 62(i), Dec. 29, 1978 (Spain).
CESAR AGUADO RENEDO, Problemas constitucionales de la potestad de gracia: en particular su control [Constitutional chal-
lenges of the power to pardon: particularly, its control], in LA DEMOCRACIA CONSTITUCIONAL: ESTUDIOS EN HOMENAJE AL PROFESOR
FRANCISCO RUBIO LLORENTE [Constitutional democracy: in homage to professor Francisco Rubio Llorente] 908 (Reyes et al. eds.
2002); ROSARIO GARCIA MAHAMUT, EL INDULTO: UN ANALISIS JURIDICO-CONSTITUCIONAL [THE PARDON: A JURIDICAL-CONSTITUTIONAL
ANALYSIS] 127-48, 149 (2004).
1 Ley de 18 de junio de 1870, de Reglas para el ejercicio de la Gracia de indulto, arts. 21-23 (B.O.E. 1870, 175) (Spain). See
also ROSARIO GARCIA MAHAMUT, SEIS REFLEXIONES SOBRE EL INDULTO Y UNA CONSIDERACION ACERCA DE LA SUSPENSION DE LA EJECUCION
DE LA PENA ANTE LA SOLICITUD DE INDULTO [SIX REFLECTIONS ON PARDON AND A CONSIDERATION ABOUT THE SUSPENSION OF IMPRISONMENT
WHEN PARDON IS REQUESTED], in CONSTITUCION, ESTADO DE LAS AUTONOMiAS Y JUSTICIA CONSTITUCIONAL [CONSTITUTION, STATE OF AUTON-
OMIES AND CONSTITUTIONAL JUSTICE] 612-13 (Luis Aguiar de Luque,Valencia, ed., 2005); Juan Luis P6rez Francesch & Fernando
Dominguez Garcia, El indulto como acto del Gobierno: una perspectiva constitucional [Pardon as a Government act: a constitu-
tional perspective], 53 REVISTA DE DERECHO POLITICO [POLITICAL LAW REVIEW] 25, 30 (2002).
Ley de 18 de junio de 1870, de Reglas para el ejercicio de la Gracia de indulto, art. 4 (B.O.E. 1870, 175) (Spain).
6 Ley de 18 de junio de 1870, de Reglas para el ejercicio de la Gracia de indulto, arts. 4, 12, 30 (B.O.E. 1870, 175) (Spain).
See generally C.E., B.O.E., Dec. 29, 1978 (Spain).
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The Law of June 18, 1870 (hereinafter
"LI"),8 when establishing rules for the exercise
of a pardon -except for the general mention of
achieving of justice, equity, or utility or public
convenience in Articles 2.3, 11, and 16-does
not determine the catalogue of reasons that
justify its granting, nor does it reveal the con-
ditions that the subject must meet to obtain it.9
In contrast to the silence guarded by
the LI, the Spanish Criminal Code (hereinafter
"CP") points to a function that the granting of
a pardon should be directed towards, when the
controversial CP Article 4.3 provides the op-
tion for the Judge or Court to address the Gov-
ernment to grant it, if the rigorous application
of the provisions of the Act results in an action
or omission being punished that, in its opinion,
should not be, or if the penalty is noticeably
excessive.10
Additionally, Article 206 the Prison Reg-
ulation Royal Decree ("RP")" refers to the spe-
cific conditions that the prisoner must meet
I Ley de 18 dejunio de 1870, de Reglas para el ejercicio de
la Gracia de indulto (B.O.E. 1870, 175) (Spain).
I FERNANDO MOLINA FERNANDEZ & LAURA POZUELO PEREZ,
EXTINCION DE LA RESPONSABILIDAD PENAL Y SUS EFECTOS [EXTINC-
TION OF THE PENAL RESPONSIBILITY AND ITS EFFECTS], in MEMENTO
PRACTICO PENAL 717 § 6587 (2017) (Fernando Molina Fernhn-
dez, ed., 2016); Francesc de Carreras, Ellndulto en Nuestro
Estado de Derecho, EL PAIS, Dec. 12, 2000, https://elpais.com/
diario/2000/12/12/espana/976575627_850215.html; JERONI-
Mo GARCIA SAN MARTIN, EL INDULTO: TRATAMIENTO Y CONTROL
JURISDICCIONAL: CON FORMULARIOS [THE PARDON: TREATMENT
& JURISDICTIONAL CONTROL: WITH APPLICATIONS] 75-76 (2d ed.
2015).
10 C.P. art. 4.3 (B.O.E. 1995, 281) (Spain).
" "The Assessment Board, on a proposal from the technical
team, may request the Prison Supervision Court, the consid-
eration of clemency, to the extent that circumstances may
require, for inmates in which the following requirements on
a long-term basis are met -for at least two years and in an
extraordinary degree: a) Good behavior; b) Performance of
a regular working activity (within the prison or outside, if it
can be considered as useful to his/her future life in freedom; c)
Participation in reeducation and social reintegration activi-
ties." Reglamento Penitenciario art. 206 (B.O.E. 1996, 40)
(Spain).
so that he or she may be eligible to receive an
individual pardon, as an extraordinary prison
benefit.12 Given its specific configuration as a
prison benefit, its motives cannot be based on
the totality of pardons granted in practice."
The guidelines referred to are exclusively fo-
cused on the post-conviction behavior of the
offender, with respect to serving his sentence.14
On the other hand, resolutions granting
pardon traditionally obey a stereotypical mod-
el in which reference to the concurrence of
"reasons ofjustice and equity" is repeated.'" They
do not explain why a decision has been made,
whether positive or a denial, because they are
used for the most heterogeneous purposes. 6
In accordance to what has been stated,
it can be concluded that we are in an area that
lacks regulation guidelines, except those in-
12 In order to access the possibility of obtaining that prison
benefit, the convicted person must show, for more than two
years and in an extraordinary way, good behavior, perfor-
mance of a normal work activity that helps him prepare for
life on the outside and participate in re-education and social
reinsertion activities. Beneficio Penitenciario de Indulto
Particular, Instrucci6n 17/2007 (Dec. 4, 2007) [hereinafter
"instrucci6n 17/2007]. See also Maria del Puerto Solar Calvo,
El Indulto: Una Perspectiva Penitenciara, LEGAL TODAY, July
31, 2014, http://www.legaltoday.com/practica-juridica/penal/
penal/el-indulto-una-perspectiva-penitenciaria; MARIA JESUS
ESPUNY & OLGA PAZ TORRES, 30 ATOS DE LA LEY DE AmNiSTIA
(1977-2007) [30 YEARS OF THE AMNESTY LAW (1977-2007)]
238, 243 (2009).
13 Puerto Solar Calvo, supra note 12; JESUS ESPUNY, supra
note 12, at 238, 243.
1 Instruccion 17/2007, supra note 12.
* See, e.g., Real Decreto 52/2019, de 8 de febrero, por el que
se indulta a don Luis Alberto Gonzhlez Sanz (B.O.E. 2019,
36) (Spain); Real Decreto 35/2019, de 25 de enero, por el que
se indulta a don Antonio Jos6 Vizcaino Peralbo (B.O.E. 2019,
24) (Spain).
16 ANA DEL PINO CARAZO, PROBLEMAS CONSTITUCIONALES DEL
EJERCICIO DE LA POTESTAD DE CESAR AGUADO RENEDO 37 (2001);
Enrique Linde Paniagua, El indulto como acto de adminis-
traci6n de justicia y su judicializaci6n. Problemas, limites y
consecuencias [Pardon as an act of administration ofjustice
and its judicialization: Problems, limits, and consequences],
5 TEORIA Y REALIDAD CONSTITUCIONAL [CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY
AND REALITY] 161, 163 (2000).
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cluded in the Spanish Criminal Code Article
4.3 and Article 206 of the RP. It is the academ-
ic opinion which has tried to fill this gap, in-
quiring about the reasons that lead to a pardon
being granted" without prejudice to those ju-
" See Pedro Annengol y Comet, Estudiospenitenciari-
os. La gracia de indulto y su ejercicio [Penitentiary studies:
The grace ofpardon and its exercise], in LA DEFENSA DE LA
SOCIEDAD [THE DEFENSE OF SOCIETY] 87 (Nabu Press rev. ed.
2012) (1875); see generally HANSGEORG BIRKOFF & MICHAEL
LEMKE, GNADENRECHT [CLEMENCY] 80-82 (2012); KATHRIN
BLAICH, SYSTEM UND RECHTSSTAATLICHE AUSGESTALTUNG DES
GNADENRECHTS [SYSTEM OF CONSTITUTIONAL DESIGN FOR THE
RIGHT OF PARDONS] 185-202 (2012); DON EMILIO BRAVO, LA
GRACIA DE INDULTO [THE GRACE OF PARDON] 197, 198 (Ma-
drid, 1889); FERNANDO CADALSo, LA LIBERTAD CONDICIONAL, EL
INDULTO Y LA AMNISTIA [CONDITIONAL FREEDOM, PARDON AND
AMNESTY] 206-07 (1921); DIMITRI DIMOULIS, DIE BEGNADIGUNG
IN VERGLEICHENDER PERSPEKTIVE: RECHTSPHILOSOPHISCHE, VER-
FASSUNGS- UND STRAFRECHTLICHE PROBLEME (STRAFRECHTLICHE
ABHANDLUNGEN) [COMPETITION IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES:
LEGAL PHILOSOPHICS, CONSTITUTIONAL AND CRIMINAL PROBLEMS
(CRIMINAL ACTS)] 341-45 (1996); ROSARIO GARCIA MAHAMUT,
EL INDULTO: UN ANALYSIS JURIDICO- CONSTITUCIONAL [THE PAR-
DON: A JURIDICAL-CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS] 120-21 (2004);
Ireneo Herrero Bernab6, El derecho de gracia: indultos, 133-
47 (2012) (unpublished doctoral thesis, Universidad Nacional
De Educaci6n A Distancia), http://e-spacio.uned.es/fez/eserv/
tesisuned:Derecho-Iherrero/Documento.pdf; HANS-HEINRICH
JESCHECK & THOMAS WEIGEND, LEHRBUCH DES STRAFRECHTS:
ALLGEMEINER TEIL [TEXTBOOK OF OF CRIMINAL LAW: GENERAL
PART] 923-24 (5th ed. 1996); Daniel T. Kobil, Should Clem-
ency Decisions be Subject o a Reasons Requirement?, 13
FED. SENT'G REP. 150, 150 (2001); Jost LLORCA ORTEGA, LA
LEY DE INDULTO: COMENTARIOS, JURISPRUDENCIA, FORMULARIOS Y
NOTAS PARA Su REFORMA [THE LAW OF PARDONS: COMMENTARY,
JURISPRUDENCE, FORMS AND NOTES FOR ITS REFORM] 75-114 (3rd
ed. 2003); Antonio Madrid P6rez, El indulto como excepci6n.
An6lisis de los indultos concedidos por el Gobierno espaihol
durante 2012 [Pardon as Exception: Analysis of Clemencies
Granted by the Spanish Government in 2012], 6 REVISTA
CRITICA PENAL Y PODER [CRIMINAL REVIEW PENAL AND POWER]
110, 110, 113, 115-16 (2014); HEINZ ZIPF ET AL., STRAFRECHT
ALLGEMEINER TEIL. TEILBAND 2: ERSCHEINUNGSFORMEN DES
VERBRECHENS UND RECHTSFOLGEN DER TAT [SECTION ON GENERAL
CRIMINAL LAW. SUB-CHAPTER 2: FORMS OF CRIMES AND LEGAL
CONSEQUENCES] 1001-03 (8th ed. 2014); AXEL MAURER, DAS
BEGNADIGUNGSRECHT IM MODERNEN VERFASSUNGS- UND KRIMINAL-
RECHT [THE PARDON IN MODERN CONSTITUTIONAL AND CRIMINAL
LAW] 47-48 (1979); SAMUEL VON PUFENDORF, UBER DIE PFLICHT
DES MENSCHEN UND DES BURGERS NACH DEM GESETZ DER NATUR
[ABOUT THE DUTY OF MAN AND THE CITIZEN ACCORDING TO THE
LAW OF NATURE] 193-94 (Klaus Luig ed. & trans., 1994);
Stefan Ulrich Pieper, Das Gnadenrecht des Bundesprcisidenten
dicial resolutions that tangentially address the
issue.
C. PURPOSES ASSIGNED TO THE INSTITUTION
OF THE PARDON IN RELATION TO THE
THEORIES OF PUNISHMENT: STARTING POINTS
Before we begin analyzing the purposes
assigned to the institution of the pardon by the
different theories of punishment, we must stop
to clarify a premise that is assumed to avoid
contaminating the examination of the different
scenarios. From now on, we will try to distin-
guish between normal scenarios and those of
an urgent nature - likened to Kantian'" states
of necessity - installed in the processes of tran-
sitional justice.19
Once such distinction is that the basis
for the granting of a pardon does not have to be
related to the purpose of the sentence. In some
types of cases, the granting of pardon ends up
being separated from the purposes assigned to
the penalty and their fulfilment; it responds to
- eine Bestandsaufrahme [The Pardon Power of the Feder-
alist President], in GNADE VOR RECHT-GNADE DURCH RECHT?
[PARDON BEFORE LAW - PARDON THROUGH LAW?] 101-05, 109
(Christian Waldhoff ed., 2014); Hinrich Rfiping, Die Gnade im
Rechstsstaat [Grace in the Law], in FESTSCHRIFT FOR FRIEDRICH
SCHAFFSTEIN [COMMEMMORATIVE FOR FRIEDRICH SCHAFFSTEIN]
36-41 (Gerald Grtinwald et al. eds., 1975); Johann-Georg
Schittzler, Gnade vor Recht [Grace Before Right], 28 NEUE
JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFT 1249, 1250-52 (1975); Leslie
Sebba, Clemency in Perspective, in CRIMINOLOGY IN PERSPEC-
TIVE: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF ISRAEL DRAPKIN 228-33 (Simha F.
Landau & Leslie Sebba eds.,1977); Luis SILVELA, EL DERECHO
PENAL ESTUDIADO EN PRINCIPIOS Y EN LA LEGISLACION VIGENTE
EN ESPAIA [CRIMINAL LAW STUDIED IN PRINCIPLES AND IN THE
CURRENT LEGISLATION IN SPAIN] 434-35 (1879); Jost ENRIQUE
SOBREMONTE MARTINEZ & MANUEL COBO DEL RoSAL, INDULTOS Y
AMNISTIA [PARDONS AND AMNESTIES] 25, 268 (1980).
1 IMMANUEL KANT, DIE METAPHYSIK DER SITTEN, IN ZWEY THEI-
LEN [THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS, IN Two PARTS] 231-32 (2d
ed. 1803).
19 See ALICIA GL GL ET AL., COLOMBIA CoMo NUEVO MODELO
PARA LA JUSTICIA DE TRANSICION [COLOMIA AS A NEW MODEL
FOR TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE] 28-30 (2017).
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other exogenous reasons.20 For example, the par-
don granted to solve a situation of economical-
ly unsustainable prison overcrowding or to cel-
ebrate commemorative events.2 ' The proposed
analysis concentrates on the first group, the
normal scenarios, and examines the different
purposes assigned to pardon to justify its use
based on the different theories of punishment.
Finally, the following analysis may be
transferred mutatis mutandis to mixed, unified,
or unifying constructions of punishment, inso-
far as they are based on or are composed of
the abstractions and premises that will be ana-
lyzed without deeming a specific study neces-
sary. Such a study, in this regard, would not add
anything to the constructions of punishment.
C.1. How the pardon fits into
absolute theories
It might seem counterintuitive that the-
ories based on retributive premises could make
room for the pardon. The often-mentioned
Kantian example of the inhabitants of the is-
land quickly comes to mind.22 Kant argued
that, even when the risk of a civil society being
dissolved exists, the last remaining murderer
in prison would have to be executed first, so
that each has done to him what his actions de-
serve.23 If society does not demand the punish-
ment, then society is responsible for the public
violation of justice.2 4
20 Eva Carracedo Carrasco, Pena e indulto: una aproxi-
maci6n holistica [Punishment and pardon: a holistic ap-
proach] 296-333 (2018).
21 Id. at 242-48, 280-89.
22 KANT, supra note 18, at 231 32.
23 Id.
24 Id.; NORBERT CAMPAGNA, STRAFRECHT UND UNBESTRAFTE
STRAFTATEN: PHILOSOPHISCHE UBERLEGUNGEN ZUR STRAFENDEN
GERECHTIGKEIT UND IHREN GRENZEN [CRIMINAL LAW AND UN-
STATED DISPUTES: PHILOSOPHICAL CONSIDERATIONS ON CRIMINAL
However, Kant also contemplated an
exception, structured as a state of necessity.25
To construct his exception, it is illustrative that
Kant resorted to the crime of rebellion, in-
spired by what took place in Scotland in 1745.
Kant observes that, if the number of accom-
plices of such action was so great that the state
almost reaches the point of having no subjects
and did not want to be dissolved by returning
to the state of nature, the sovereign would have
power, in that extreme case (casus necessitatis),
to judge and deliver a judgement imposing an-
other penalty on criminals instead of the death
penalty, in order to preserve the life of the peo-
ple as a whole.26
At the heart of absolute theories, there-
fore, resorting to pardon is eventually defend-
ed. The question that continuously arises is: in
which cases is its use advocated?
i) In exceptional circumstances, like
those Kant would assume, those the-
ories allow a relaxation of his pos-
tulates and accept the possibility of
employing pardon.27
ii) In scenarios considered as normal:
(a) The arguments used to defend
the pardon are not specific to the
absolute theories nor do they sur-
JUSTICE AND ITS LIMITS] 75 76 (2007); DIMOULIs, DIE BEGNADI-
GUNG, supra note 17, at 595.
21 See Samuel T. Morison, The Politics of Grace: On the
Moral Justification ofExecutive Clemency, 9 BUFF. L. REV.
101, 109-10 (2005) (noting that Kant believed that the state
retains a right of necessity to grant clemency in extreme situa-
tions).
26 See KANT, supra note 18, at 231-32, (explaining that the
sovereign would not implement this decision by means of a
public law, but through an act of authority, as an act of the law
of majesty that, as a pardon, can only be exercised in isolated
cases); VON PUFENDORF, supra note 17, at 194.
21 KATHLEEN DEAN MOORE, PARDONS: JUSTICE, MERCY & THE
PUBLIC INTEREST 164, 201-02 (Oxford Univ. Press 1997)
(1989).
10 Washington College of Law Spring 2019
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pass the premises on which they
are based28 (making use of reasons
such as offender rehabilitation or
the achievement of heroic merits
and services)29 and, consequently,
they will be analyzed later; or
(b) They defend the granting of for-
giveness in favor of amnesty (like
Hegel)so or the forgiveness of the
victim,3 ' not the pardon3 2 and,
therefore, outside the scope of
our analysis; or
(c) They are justified: (c. 1.) when
the expiatory purpose or moral
reform of the convict has been
completed earlier or (c. 2.) when
based on moral or legal just des-
serts, the act of the pardon in-
tends to replace deficiencies or
correct dysfunctions that are ob-
served when assuming the said
premises.33 In this regard, the
constructions based on the idea
28 Clifford Dome & Kenneth Gewerth, Mercy in a Climate of
Retributive Justice: Interpretations from a National Survey of
Executive Clemency Procedures, 25 NEW ENG. J. CRIM. & CIV.
CONFINEMENT 413, 450 (2007); Heidi M. Hurd, The Morality of
Mercy, OHIO STATE J. OF CRIM. LAW 389, 417 (2007); Morison,
supra note 25, at 112.
29 MOORE, supra note 27, 197; Elizabeth Rapaport, Retribu-
tion and Redemption in the Operation ofExecutive Clemency,
74 CHI. KENT L. REV. 1501, 1523-31 (2000).
30 GEORG WILHELM FRIEDRICH HEGEL, GRUNDLINIEN DER
PHILOSOPHIE DES RECHTS: NATURRECHT UND STAATSWISSENSCHAFT
vi GRUNDRISSE [BASICS OF PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHTS: NATURAL LAW
AND STATE SCIENCE IN AN OUTLINE] 293-94 § 282 (1821).
1 See KANT, supra note 18, at 236 (explaining his theory in
relation to crimes of lese majesty).
32 HEINZ ZIPF ET AL., STRAFRECHT ALLGEMEINER TEIL. TEILBAND
2: ERSCHEINUNGSFORMEN DES VERBRECHENS UND RECHTSFOLGEN
DER TAT [CRIMINAL LAW GENERAL PART. PART 2: APPEARANCE OF
THE CRIMINAL AND LEGAL ACTIONS OF THE ACT] 135-36 (2014).
* Hugo Adam Bedau, A Retributive Theory of the Pardon-
ing Power, 27, U. RICH. L. REV. 185, 189 (1992); Jeffrie G.
Murphy, Mercy and Legal Justice, 4, SOC. PHIL. & POL'Y 1, 7,
9 (1986).
of just desserts as a metaconcept
stand out34 : in the same way as
the offender deserves the punish-
ment, he may gain the benefit of
pardon.
In both scenarios of justified pardons
(c.1 and c.2), the application of the pardon has
now been surpassed by more precise institu-
tions, through the adequate application of the
legal theory of crime developed in our legal
system and due to fundamental premises of
our rule of law. 3
When it is a matter of resolving the an-
ticipated fulfilment of the expiatory purpose
assigned to the punishment, there are already
mechanisms designed to adapt the prison re-
gime applicable to the subject who shows good
behavior, who is already "reformed," as well as
legal solutions that allow early release, an effec-
tive shortening of the time that he is deprived
of his liberty.3 ' Therefore, a pardon would be
overcome by the current gradual prison regime
(including parole)38 and the prison benefit of
granting parole in advance.39
3 See, e.g., Hurd, supra note 28, at 392-93, 417.
3 MOORE, supra note 27, at 10; Claudia Card, On Mercy, 81
PHIL. REV. 182, 184-89, 204-06 (1972); Dome, supra note
28, at 413, 421; Dan Markel, Against Mercy, 88 MINN. L. REV.
1421, 1471-73 (2004); (defending the redirection to legisla-
tion and not to pardon); Tara Smith, Tolerance & Forgiveness:
Virtues or Vices?, 14 J. APPLIED PHIL. 31, 39-40 (1997).
31 Markel, supra note 35, at 1425-78; Rapaport, supra note
29, at 1501-02.
3 KARL DAVID AUGUST RODER, DIE HERRSCHENDEN GRUNDLEH-
REN VON VERBRECHEN UND STRAFE IN IHREN INNEREN WIDER-
SPRUCHEN [THE INITIAL BASICS OF CRIMINAL AND PENALTY IN
THEIR INNER CONFLICTS] 104-05, 127-28 (1867).
38 CADALSo, supra note 17, at 206; Markel, supra note 35, at
1468-69.
3 Reglamento Penitenciario arts. 202.2, 205 (B.O.E. 1996,
40) (Spain). Nothing could prevent the incorporation of the
scenario of article 206 in the regime provided for in the pre-
ceding provision.
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If the argument used at the heart of
absolute theories is constructed based on the
rule of behavior - that an act should no longer
be subject to blame or criminal punishment -
then the act no longer necessarily needs to be
addressed as a statutory offence. Therefore, the
use of pardon has been replaced by legislative
reform and by the subsequent revision of the
judgements.
Another main use for those who defend
resorting to pardon within these theories, is to
solve proportionality deficiencies that would
result in the application of excessive penal-
ties. In this area, the use of that institution is
intended to solve malfunctions of the rule in
the abstract, and to correct the punitive excess
that the application of the rule to a specific case
may generate. If the deficiency refers to the rule
in the abstract, then there is no solution other
than legal reform and, once again, a revision of
the judgements passed under the previous and
more burdensome regulatory regime.40
If the point is to adjust the application
of the general rule to the particularities of the
specific case, which is assumed as the corner-
stone of the issue, then there are currently
sufficient mechanisms available to achieve the
necessary individualization and adjustment
without resorting to pardons. The Judges im-
plement the individualization and determi-
nation of the penalty, in accordance with the
guidelines (adaptable) set by the legislator. This
task of individualization is not limited to the
sentencing phase, but also, once the judgement
is passed and a specific penalty is imposed,
all the pre-established measures in the prison
regulations are deployed to carry out said indi-
40 Daniel T. Kobil, Quality ofMercy Strained: Wresting the
Pardoning Power from the King, 69 TEX. L. REv. 569, 627-30
(1991).
vidualization in the gradual enforcement of the
sentence which, could even be suspended.4'
If the sentencing court noticed the im-
possibility of reaching a solution that was
proportional to the specific case, then the de-
ficiency would reside not in the individualiza-
tion process, but in the rule to be applied and,
therefore, a question of unconstitutionality42
could be raised and, additionally, a request for
the repeal or modification of criminal legal
provisions.43
Curiously, the absolute theories would
also try to solve, through the pardon, the dispro -
portion of the imposed punishment when the
prisoners personal circumstances changed.
In those cases, the solution lies with, as already
settled by our legislator, allowing that adjust-
ment ex ante, incorporating legal provisions
(suspension of imprisonment, access to parole
or the progression through the prison system)
that include those cases that are deemed rele-
vant (qualified medical conditions or advanced
aging). 4
Finally, it is observed how the defenders
of retribution theories would have structured
the pardon as a mechanism to correct the de-
ficiencies in the application of the deserved
41 C.P. (B.O.E. 1995, 281) (Spain).
4 The result of which could be the interpretation according to
the Constitution of the challenged precept. Enrique Bacigalupo
Zapater, La RigurosaAplicacion de la Ley [The StrictAppli-
cation of the Law], 48 ANUARIO DE DERECHO PENAL Y CIENCIAS
PENALES [YB. OF CRIM. LAW AND CRIM. Sci.] 862 (1995); Javier
Shnchez-Vera G6mez-Trelles, Una lectura critica de la Ley
de Indulto [A Critical Review ofPardon Law], 2 INDRET 1,
12-13, 17-18 (2008).
41 SILVELA, supra note 17, at 436-37 (noting that repeal or
modification that could be implemented not only at the initia-
tive of the sentencing court, but also in accordance with the
specific mechanisms established in the Spanish Constitution).
4 Markel, supra note 35, at 1470-7 1.
4 C.P. art. 92(3) (B.O.E. 1995, 281) (Spain).
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punishment. The catalogue of scenarios that
are raised is broad. 46
In fact, this body of reasons is so vast be-
cause, in practice, it is projected on all those cas-
es that lend to the construction of the criminal
theory (the validity of the rule of behavior and
the rule of punishment being assumed). In the
end, the reasons would allow the conclusion of
the inexistence of a criminal act committed by
a subject to whom criminal responsibility can
be demanded. Not because the act is made to
fictitiously disappear, but because, more than
anything, it cannot be considered criminal47 (or
the act does not exist, it is not statutorily de-
fined, it is not unlawful, it is not culpable, or it
is not punishable) .4 The application of crimi-
nal theory to these cases makes it unnecessary
and inadmissible to resort to the institution of
the pardon to resolve an issue that the applica-
tion of justice itself solves.
C.2. How the pardon fits into the
general prevention theories
C2.1. Pardon and negautive general
prevention theory
It seems that negative general preven-
tion theories would not find space for pardons.
The father of the psychological coercion the-
ory, Feuerbach, assumed that the legal threat
46 See Ross Harrison, The Equality of Mercy, in JURISPRU-
DENCE, CAMBRIDGE ESSAYS 119 (Hyman Gross & Ross Harrison
eds., 1992); MOORE, supra note 27, passim; James Barnett, The
Grounds ofPardon, J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 490, 502-03,
511-12, 515-16 (1927); Kobil, supra note 40, at 630-32;
Morison, supra note 25, at 25; Nigel Walker, The Quiddity of
Mercy, 70 PHL. 27, 33-34 (1995).
4 Markel, supra note 35, at 1455.
48 Hugo A. Bedau, A Retributive Theory of the Pardoning
Power, 27 U. RICH. L REV. 185, 194 (1993) ("We cannot infer
from the fact that a given offender does not 'deserve' a given
sentence, that the offender does 'deserve' the mercy that a par-
don brings. For it may be that the offender does not 'deserve'
anything at all[.]") (emphases in original).
would not be sufficient, it being essential that
the threatened evil be applied as soon as the of-
fense was determined. For the threat contained
in the law to be real, it must truly imply the real
imposition of an evil.49
It seems to be confirmed then that, in
general, at the heart of these constructions,
there would be a shielded opposition to the use
of pardons and forgiveness.50 However, Feuer-
bach himself made exceptions to his general
opposition, based on the indifference of the
application of pardons for the purpose of de-
terrence in cases where judgments are consid-
ered unjust or perceived as such.
The reasons that justify resorting to par-
dons, in accordance with the arguments used
by Feuerbach5 ' and Mittermaier,52 can be ar-
ranged into two categories: (i) the arguments
used within normal contexts; and (ii) the rea-
sons referring to extraordinary contexts, in
which its use serves to maintain the legal state
against pressing dangers (for example, conspir-
acies).53
In normal scenarios, the reasons can be
divided, in turn, into three subgroups:
[1] The cases in which, although the sen-
tence cannot be regarded as ajudicial
error subject to review, it provokes a
public outcry. The scenarios in which
" PAUL JOHANN ANSELM VON FEUERBACH, LEHRBUCH DES GE-
MEINEN IN DEUTSCHLAND GULTIGEN PEINLICHEN RECHTS [TEXTBOOK
OF THE COMMUNITY IN GERMANY VALID PERMANENT RIGHTS]
38-40 (Giessen, Heyer, 1847); PAUL JOHANN ANSELM VON
FEUERBACH , REVISION DER GRUNDSATZE UND GRUNDBEGRIFFE
DES POSITIVEN PEINLICHEN RECHTS [REVISION OF THE PRINCIPLES
AND BASIC CONCEPTS OF POSITIVE PUBLIC LAW] 48-51 (Erfurt,
Henning, 1799).
50 DIMOULIS, DIE BEGNADIGUNG, supra note 17, at 596; MARK
FREEMAN, NECESSARY EVILS 21 (2009).
51 FEUERBACH, LEHRBUCH, supra note 49, at 120-21; FEUER-
BACH, REVISION, supra note 49, at xxvii-xxviii.
FEUERBACH, LEHRBUCH, supra note 49, at 122, notes II to IV
Id. at 121.
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this aversion could arise, are identi-
fied as those cases in which material
justice would not correspond to legal
justice, at the time it was applied by
the sentencing court:
(a) Due to a temporary lack of adap-
tation: Cases where society has
evolved in some way that legal
texts have not been capable of
keeping up with.54 For example,
those cases in which a certain
conduct should no longer be
considered as criminal (or should
not be so severely punished5 5),
but the legal text has not yet been
repealed or modified.6
(b) To cover an area that neither the
judicial power, given its constric-
tions,57 nor the legislative power
reach.58 There are the scenarios
in which, considering the special
circumstances of the case and
given the express wording of the
law, the adjudicating body must
be subjected to an asymmetry be-
tween formal justice and materi-
al justice occurs again. This time
not because the legal text is dis-
proportionate in the abstract, but
because of the idiosyncrasy of the
case that is pending before the
Court, which is limited by its duty
' ANTONIO BERISTAIN IPINA, UN DERECHO FUNDAMENTAL DE LA
PERSONA TODAVIA NO SUFICIENTEMENTE RECONOCIDO: EL DERE-
CHO AL PERDON [A FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT OF THE PERSON STILL
NOT SUFFICIENTLY RECOGNIZED: THE RIGHT TO PARDON] 22 (1985-
1986).
" VITTORIO EMANUELE ORLANDO, PRINCIPII DI DIRITTO COSTI-
TUZIONALE [PRINCIPLES OF CONSTITUIONAL LAW] 220 § 287 (5th
ed. 1920).
6 FEUERBACH, REVISION, supra note 49, at xxviii.
Id. at xxvii-xxix.
FEUERBACH, LEHRBUCH, supra note 49, at 121.
to apply the law.5 9 A pardon would
serve to correct the severity of the
law that has become cruel, allow-
ing it to maintain the dissuasive
authority of the law when faced
with the risk of provoking moral
repugnance or indifference.6 0
(c) Because the delivery of a judge-
ment goes against the principle of
equality, by breaking away from
the normal repressive practice.'
[2] Cases in which the sentencing judg-
ment does not cause an outcry, its
enforcement can be disapproved of,
and a pardon would be innocuous to
the punishment's deterrence effect.
Its granting is recognized as a reward
for the offender's good behavior
from perspectives similar to those of
special prevention.6 2
[3] As a reward mechanism that encour-
ages collaboration with justice, prom-
ising impunity to gang members or
participants in collective actions who
inform on fellow members.3
Once those cases are identified where
resorting to pardon is justified, based on the
negative general deterrence theory, the follow-
ing is observed:
i) In exceptional scenarios, the nega-
tive general prevention theories ex-
pressly allow for the use of a pardon,
when, ordinary means for overcom-
ing these exceptional circumstances
are expected to fail.
1' FEUERBACH, REVISION, supra note 49, at xxvii-xxix.
60 FEUERBACH, LEHRBUCH, supra note 49, at 121 § 63.
61 DIMOULIS, DIE BEGNADIGUNG, supra note 17, at 455-59.
62 FEUERBACH, LEHRBUCH, supra note 49, at 122, note IV
63 Id. at 121 § 63.
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ii) However, as Feuerbach himself antic-
ipated , the solutions regarding nor-
mal scenarios can be found in other
ordinary mechanisms of the criminal
system.
If the text of the law has become obso-
lete, nothing prevents its reform; both in terms
of adapting social consideration with respect to
the rule of behavior, and adjusting the quantum
of the penalty that would be imposed on a spe-
cific crime by minimizing it.65 This would allow
judgements delivered under the previous and
more burdensome regime to be reviewed.
If the point is to adjust the ideal of ma-
terialjustice to a specific case that presents par-
ticular circumstances, to solve a deficiency in
terms of individualization when applying the
rule, Feuerbach himself admits the possibility
of defending an alternative in which it is ac-
cepted that the adjudicating body is able to re-
solve said mismatch through the interpretation
and application of the rule.6
Although Mittermaier himself had al-
ready announced the controversy and diffi-
culties of resorting to pardon regarding this
specific justification, if the intention was to
acknowledge a reward for the convicts, as an in-
centive to leave prison early, other institutions
have far exceeded its use. Mittermaier himself
did not discard the possibility of making use of
the institution of the indeterminate judgement
as a mechanism to value not only the necessary
reparations of the harm caused by the crime
and the protection of society, but also reform
64 FEUERBACH, REVISION, supra note 49, at xxvii-xxix.
66 ENRIQUE BACIGALUPO ZAPATER, JUSTICIA PENAL Y DERECHOS
FUNDAMENTALES [CRIMINAL JUSTICE AND FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS]
20-22 (2002); ENRIQUE LINDE PANIAGUA, AmNiSTIA E INDULTO EN
ESPAIA [AMNESTY AND PARDON IN SPAIN] 43 (1976).
66 FEUERBACH, REVISION, supra note 49, at xxvii-xxix.
6' FEUERBACH, Lehrbuch, supra note 49, at 122, note IV
of the offender.6 1 Consequently, the use of par-
dons would be relieved by a gradual prison re-
gime (including parole) and the prison benefit
of granting parole in advance.
Finally, as Bacigalupo Zapater point-
ed out, resorting to pardons to incentivize the
collaboration with justice would have been re-
placed by an express regulation to that effect,
so that the institution of the pardon would
have become, from this perspective as well, su-
perfluous.6 9
C2.2. Pardon andpositiVe general
prevention theory
Prima facie, it seems again that there is
no room for pardon within the positive gener-
al prevention theories. However, Jakobs him-
self who, let's recall, demands the affliction of
criminal pain) or authors who advocate for ide-
alistic foundations of punishment within those
constructions, recognize the possibility of re-
sorting to the said institution.70 In this regard,
it is noteworthy that Silva Sanchez has already
pointed out that "positive general prevention is
surely the foundation of forgiveness in criminal
law."7' So, the questions that arise are, in which
cases and under what conditions?
Within the positive general prevention
theory, I will highlight the constructions elabo-
rated by Jakobs himself and by Dimoulis.
68 Notes on Current and Recent Events., 3 J. Am. Inst. Crim.
L. & Criminology 266, 303-05 (1912).
69 ENRIQUE BACIGALUPO ZAPATER, DERECHO PENAL Y EL ESTADO
DE DERECHO [CRIMINAL LAW AND THE RULE OF LAW] 23 (2005).
10 For the purpose of this study, theories considering forgive-
ness as a functional equivalent of punishment are excluded
because, despite their suggestion, they do not determine in
what specific assumptions that interchangeability would be
acceptable, arguing for the unpredictability of the granting as a
requirement for subrogation.
1 Jesis-Maria Silva Shnchez, De nuevo, elperd6n [Again, a
pardon], 4 INDRET PENAL 1, 1-2 (2011), www.indret.com/pdf/
editorial.2_4.pdf.
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In exceptional scenarios, Jakobs estab-
lishes the possibility of using the pardon as a
practical remedy to such situations,7 2 expressly
following Kohlers thesis." Pardons could be
used as a mechanism whereby the implemen-
tation of strict enforcement of the sentence is
more flexible for state reconstruction, within
the framework of achieving internal peace in
critical environments.4
In normal scenarios, Jakobs himself also
positively considers the possibility of using the
pardon mechanism, assuming it as an obstacle
to material punishment or as a complex mech-
anism.5 Pardons could serve not only (proce-
durally) to avoid an inopportune process, but
also (legally-materially) to correct an erroneous
judicial decision - modifying the evidenced
fact or object examined in the proceedings -
or to make an adjustment to a legal assessment
of the fact, which has been modified but not
yet been reflected in the appropriate retroac-
tive legislative change - the fact or object was
correctly evidenced and remains intact, but a
change in the assessment of that fact has oc-
curred.6
Setting aside the first assumption relat-
ed to the avoidance of an inopportune process,
an objective that would not be possible with-
in most legal systems," the two possible uses
that Jakobs points out would be reduced to
these purposes: the correction of errors made
12 See GUNTHER JAKOBS, STRAFRECHT ALLGEMEINER TEL: DIE
GRUNDLAGEN UND DIE ZURECHNUNGSLEHRE [CRIMINAL LAW GEN-
ERAL PART: THE FOUNDATIONS AND THE COURT] 5 (2nd ed. 1991).
1 Michael KOhler, Strafgesetz, Gnade und Politik nach
Rechtsbegriffen [Penal law, Grace and Politics according to
legal concepts], in RECHTSDOGMATIK UND RECHTSPOLITIK [LEGAL
DOGMATICS AND LEGAL POLICY] 68-74 (Karsten Schmidt ed.,
1990).
* See Jakobs, supra note 72, at 345 n.41.
1 Id. at 344.
6 Id. at 345.
1 Given that, within them, to grant an individual pardon, a
final guilty judgement is demanded.
by the judicial body and the adjustment to the
new legal assessment that corresponds to the
fact-which will remain unchanged- (the solu-
tion to the temporary lack of adaptation that
was pointed out earlier and indicated by Feuer-
bach).
In turn, Dimoulis divides the potential
use of pardons into two scenarios: the normal
scenario and a scenario that he characterizes as
exceptional, or as a state or situation of emer-
gency linked to political changes that have oc-
curred in a society.8
When analyzing the normal scenarios,
Dimoulis observes that pardons can serve as a
mechanism to achieve the aims of positive gen-
eral prevention9, although he announces, from
the start of his theoretical constructions, that
other resources or alternatives to replace it in
terms of the said purpose can be found without
any problems.o
These are cases in which pardon is rec-
ognized and used as a means to repair the errors
of justice (which are still human, ergo fallible)
in order to achieve materialjustice." This mech-
anism, as an "safety valve", would be aimed at
See DIMOULIS, DIE BEGNADIGUNG, supra note 17, at 465-72.
* The said author, starts from the idea pointed out by BER-
NARDO JOSE FEIJoo SANCHEZ, LA PENA COMO INSTITUCION JURIDI-
CA: RETRIBUCION Y PREVENCION GENERAL [PENALTY AS A LEGAL
INSTITUTION: GENERAL COMPENSATION AND PREVENTION] 311
(2014), that in certain cases in which pardon is granted, for
example, because the penalty imposed is unjust, if instead of
granting pardon the sentence was served, that unjust exigence
of the punishment weakens the purpose of positive general
prevention. It reduces it to the extent that it would contradict
the commitment to present criminal proceedings as necessary
and just and, at the same time, damages trust in institutions,
denying the legitimacy of the criminal law system by demon-
strating both its rigidity and its dysfunctionality.
so See DIMOULIS, DIE BEGNADIGUNG, supra note 17, at 450-5 1,
602-04.
1 DImITI DIMOULIS, Die Gnade als Symbol [Grace as a Sym-
bol], 81 KRITISCHE VIERTELJAHRESSCHRIFT FUR GESETZGEBUNG
UND RECHTSWISSENSCHAFT [CRITICAL Q. LETTER FOR LEGIS. &
LEGAL Sc.] 357, 357-59 (1998).
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providing a quick and effective response to the
criminal system's legitimacy crisis within the
framework of sentencing, without it being nec-
essary to resort to reforming the system.82
In these scenarios, pardons would not
only have a direct function but a symbolic-lib-
erating effect in which it publicly demonstrates
that the criminal law system corrects its own
deficiencies and has the necessary capacity to
adapt in situations of crisis." The key to grant-
ing pardons would not, therefore, be rooted in
the error contained in a specific judgement,
but on the lack of necessity in terms of posi-
tive general prevention. Thus, pardons would
become a positive instrument to legitimize the
criminal system.
However, once these conclusions are
reached, Dimoulis himself recognizes that, if
the institution were to be conceptually abol-
ished by a rationalization of the criminal sys-
tem, structural deficiencies would not appear.6
There would be no insurmountable obstacles
to its elimination. However, and despite reit-
erating that its abolition would not find insu-
perable impediments7 , he states that pardons
will not disappear for three reasons: (a) because
the executive branch would never want to lose
its traditional power" - an irrelevant argument
82 Id. at 368.
a See DIMOULIS, DIE BEGNADIGUNG, supra note 17, at 450-52.
1 Id. at 451.
a DIMOULIS, Die Gnade, supra note 81, 363-68 (1998).
86 See DIMOULIS, DIE BEGNADIGUNG, supra note 17, at 602.
But see, Rachel E. Barkow, Clemency and Presidential
Administration of Criminal Law, 90 N.YU. L. REV. 802, 802,
807-808, 832-861, 869 (2015); Rachel E. Barkow & Mark
Osler, Restructuring Clemency: The Cost ofIgnoring Clemen-
cy and a Plan for Renewal, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 2, 5, 17, 18,
26 (2015).
a See DIMOULIS, DIE BEGNADIGUNG, supra note 17, at 603.
8 Manuel Fanega, El Indulto: Anclisis yAlternativas Bajo el
Prisma Criminol6gico [The Pardon: Analysis andAlternatives
Under the Criminological Prism], in CRIMINOLOGiA Y JUSTICIA
[CRIMINOLOGY & JUSTICE] 114 (Guillermo Gonzhlez et al. eds.,
for our analysis; (b) for the symbolic function
assigned to the institution; and (c) because, in
crisis situations, exceptional scenarios, it is a
unique mechanism.8 9
In relation to the symbolic function (b),
the said author concludes that the fact that
this task can be assigned to the institution of
pardon, related to the guarantee of satisfying
material justice which allows people to trust
the system, does not imply that this institution
has to be simply accepted and that it has to be
acknowledged as eternal.90 Insofar as it is rep-
resented as a last illusion (letzte Taiuschung) of
an imaginary guarantee of the justice of pun-
ishment (which materializes in a few cases), re-
sorting to pardon can be overcome by creating
other forms of conflict resolution in the sys-
tem.91 Pardons are surpassed once again; this
time, from the perspective of positive general
prevention.
C2.3. Pardons and specialprevention theories
Within the special prevention theories,
pardons would have been accepted natural-
ly, 92 between all of the institutions which made
enforcing the punishment more flexible (sus-
pending the sentence, replacing punishments,
3d ed. 2016); LINDE PANIAGUA, AmNiSTIA, supra note 65, at
70-71.
89 DIMOULIS, Du BEGNADIGUNG, supra note 17, at 603.
9o Dimoulis, Die Gnade, supra note 81, at 365-366; DIMou-
LIS, DIE BEGNADIGUNG, supra note 17, at 604.
1 DIMOULIS, Du BEGNADIGUNG, supra note 17, at 604.
9 The reasons why pardons would have fit so naturally are
based on the centrality of the offender's personal circumstanc-
es in the construction of the special prevention theories; and
in the fact that precisely in the phase of enforcement of the
sentence, the only phase in which the post-sententiam pardon
can appear is in that which the reasons of special prevention
are projected or have to be taken into consideration, even if
a monist theory on special prevention is not defended. Claus
Roxin, Sentido y limites de la pena estatal [Meaning and Lim-
its ofState Punishment], in PROBLEMAS BASICOS DEL DERECHO
PENAL [Basic Problems of Criminal Law] 31-32 (Diego-Manu-
el Luz6n Pefia trans., 1976).
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the conditional sentence, parole, or the reduc-
tion or remission of the sentence).
In view of the above, it is not at all sur-
prising that Von Liszt, who was considered the
founder of these theories, came to defend the
use of the pardon.9 3 However, and this point
is fundamental, among the functions that he
assigns to pardons, no special prevention ob-
jectives are mentioned.9 4 The said author states
that a decision that does not give the convict
any control in terms of obtaining his antici-
pated release, a measure over which he has no
influence on and does not provide him with
any certainties, is of no use for his resocializa-
tion. For this reason, he would defend, instead
of pardon, an indeterminate sentence or, as he
preferred to call it, a suspended sentence.9 5
" Von Liszt identifies three justifications for pardons: (i) as
a self-correction of justice, as a safety valve, with which it is
possible to reconcile the rigid generalization of the law with
the demands of material justice; (ii) to improve judicial errors,
whether true-confinned or presumptive; and (iii) to help the
triumph of state intelligence or politics, at the expense of the
Law. FRANZ VON LISZT, LEHRBUCH DES DEUTSCHEN STRAFRECHTS
[TEXTBOOK OF GERMAN CRIMINAL LAW] 268-69 (10th ed.
1900); FRANZ VON LISZT & EBERHARD SCHMIDT, LEHRBUCH DES
DEUTSCHEN STRAFRECHTS [TEXTBOOK OF GERMAN CRIMINAL LAW]
440 (26th ed. 1932).
" FRANZ VON LISZT, Bedingte Verurteilung und bedingte
Begnadigung [Conditional Condemnation and Conditional
Pardon], in 3 VERGLEICHENDE DARSTELLUNG DES DEUTSCHEN
UND AUSLANDISCHEN STRAFRECHTS: VORARBEITEN ZUR DEUTSCHEN
STRAFRECHSREFORM, ALLGEMEINER TEIL [COMPARATIVE PRESEN-
TATION OF GERMAN AND FOREIGN CRIMINAL LAW: PREPARATIONS
FOR THE GERMAN CRIMINAL RENEWAL, GENERAL PART] 58-59
(Karl Birkmeyer et al. eds., 1908); Franz von Liszt, Welche
Mafiregeln konnen dem Gesetzgeber zur Einschrcinkung der
kurzzeitigen Freiheitsstrafe mpfohlen werden? [What mea-
sures can be recommended to the legislature to limit short-
term imprisonment?], 1 MITTEILUNGEN DER INTERNATIONALEN
KRIMINALISTISCHEN VEREINIGUNG [COMM. OF THE INT'L CRIM.
Ass'N] 51 (1889); Franz von Liszt, Kriminalpolitische Auf-
gaben [I] [Criminal Policy Tasks [I]], 9 ZEITSCHRIFT FOR DIE
GESAMTE STRAFRECHTSWISSENSCHAFT [J. OF ALL CRIM. ScI.] 452,
495 (1889); Franz von Liszt, KriminalpolitischeAufgaben [If]
[Criminal Policy Tasks [II]], 9 ZEITSCHRIFT FOR DIE GESAMTE
STRAFRECHTSWISSENSCHAFT [J. OF ALL CRiM. SC.] 737, 781-82 (1889).
95 von Liszt, Welche Ma/isregeln, supra note 94, at 44;
von Liszt, Kriminalpolitische Aufgaben II, supra note 94, at
a) Negative special prevention theories
From a negative perspective, focused on
the protection of society against the offender,
it would seem apriori that a pardon would not
fit, as it entails releasing from prison those who
still have to be neutralized and kept away from
the community. However, as Freeman9 6 states
with regard to amnesty, the other form of state
pardon, a pardon may be conditioned. There-
fore, measures may be established that aim to
achieve this incapacitation of the offender in
the first place, to achieve the protection of soci-
ety on a secondary level.
Although these constructions do not
determine which criteria positively guide the
granting of a pardon or its grounds, instead
they are centered on protecting the innocu-
ous purpose related to granting pardons, they
cannot be marginalized, insofar as they suggest
considering the conditioning of the pardon as
a functional equivalent to applying the punish-
ment. Note that this conditioning is an essen-
tial element of parole and therefore, the practi-
cal likeness of this institution for that purpose
could be stated.97
b) Positive special prevention theories
From the perspective of positive special
prevention constructions, however, there would
be reasons to justify resorting to pardons to
achieve the convict's reinsertion into society.
These are based on two types of arguments.
755-76.
96 FREEMAN, supra note 50, at 22.
1 Gimeno G6mez, La gracia de indulto [The grace ofpar-
don], 4 REVISTA DE DERECHO PROCESAL IBEROAMERICANA [MAG.
PROCEDURAL L. IBEROAMERICANA] 899, 925 (1972); Amadeo
Pineda, Derecho de gracia o indulto [Right of Grace or Par-
don], in 11 IURIS: ACTUALIDAD Y PRACTICA DEL DERECHO [JURIS:
ACTUALITY & PRACTICE OF LAW] 34, 36-38 (1997).
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A) The first subgroup includes those
grounds that defend the use of the
institution of pardon when the reso-
cialization that the penalty intend-
ed to achieve has already been real-
ized and the remaining sentence to
be served becomes superfluous and
even harmful98; or when the re-ed-
ucation of the offender no longer
needs to be verified in prison.99
(B) Additionally, a second positive use
for pardons can be found, as an au-
tonomous mechanism incentivizing
the convicted person and giving him
hope, by rewarding him if he suc-
ceeds in achieving the penalty's ob-
jective: his resocialization.00 Pardons
are configured as a supreme reward
in response to the offender's excel-
lent behavior, which signifies that the
purpose has been achieved.'0 '
An analysis of the arguments used by
the defenders of positive special prevention
theories in relation to the limits of the pardon's
use, shows the following:
98 DIMOULIS, DIE BEGNADIGUNG, supra note 17, at 343 45;
LINDE PANIAGUA, AmNiSTA, supra note 65, at 73.
" ENRICO FERRI, PRINCIPII DI DIRITTO CRIMINALE [PRINCIPLES OF
CRIMINAL LAW] 179-80 (1928) (basing argument on positivist
ideas). However, Ferri himself, who showed his reluctance
regarding the employment of the institution, admitted that par-
dons would have been surpassed by the conditional sentence
and parole (which would serve to undertake a periodic review
of judgements and take into account the convicted person's
meritorious behavior, having a jurisdictional guarantee that the
pardon didn't have).
100 Miguel Ruiz Mufioz, A prop6sito de la politica de clemen-
cia en Derecho de la Competencia [About the clemency policy
in Competition Law], ALMACtN DE DERECHO [LAW MAG.],
Sept. 6, 2016, https://almacendederecho.org/perdon-unos-pa-
nales/ (basing this analysis on competitive law).
101 Margaret Colgate Love, Fear ofForgiving: Rule and
Discretion in the Theory and Practice ofPardoning, 13 FED.
SENT'G REP., 125 (2000-2001); David A. Shaw, Clemency: A
Useful Rehabilitation Tool, ARMY LAW., Aug. 1975, at 32.
i) In exceptional cases, those identified
as transitional contexts, the defend-
ers of these theories expressly and
unanimously accept resorting to par-
dons (either by using the state intelli-
gence idea employed by Von Liszt0 2
or by using Merkel0 3 or Bacigalupo
Zapater's104 idea on the predominant
general political interests or limiting
their use to certain crimes -political-
as suggested by Ferrios
ii) Regarding normal scenarios, func-
tions assigned to the pardon that have
been assumed or could be assumed
by other ordinary mechanisms of the
criminal system have been identified.
The transfer of functions to other
institutions and the overcoming of
pardons are both recognized and as-
sumed by the defenders of preven-
tive-special postulates.
In normal scenarios, the justifications
given to pardons can be divided into two sub-
groups: those related to the accomplishment of
the punishment's purpose - the resocialization
of the convicted person - and those not specifi-
cally related to the achievement of that purpose
(such as serving as a correction mechanism
when faced with a dysfunctional application of
a general law to a particular case, as a tempo-
rary adjustment mechanism between social re-
ality and a new legislation, and as a mechanism
to amend judicial errors).
102 VON LISZT, LEHRBUCH DES DEUTSCHEN STRAFRECHTS, supra
note 93, at 268.
103 ADOLF MERKEL, LEHRBUCH DES DEUTSCHEN STRAFRECHTS
[TEXTBOOK OF GERMAN CRIMINAL LAW] 251 53 (Stuttgart,
1889).
104 BACIGALUPO ZAPATER, JUSTICIA PENAL supra note 65, at 25.
10 FERRI, supra note 99, at 178-79 (following FRANcOIS
GuIzOT, De la peine de mort en matitre politique [Death pen-
alty in political matters] 172-73, 177 (Paris, 2d ed. 1822)).
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If the aim of the pardon is to adjust the
application of the general rule to the particu-
larities of a specific case, it has already been
pointed out when dealing with absolute the-
ories, that there are sufficient mechanisms to
achieve the necessary individualization without
the need to use the pardon.
If, as Ferri observed,10 6 the criminal pun-
ishment provokes a public outcry as a result of
a temporary imbalance (insofar as the current
legislation is more beneficial for the convicted
person, having been adopted after the judge-
ment was delivered and which the convict is
now serving), nothing prevents, in accordance
with the current regulation, the review of the
judgements delivered under the previous and
more burdensome regime.
If the aim is to defend the pardon as a
mechanism for repairing judicial errors, as Von
Liszto' defended, in relation to the fundamen-
tal rights and freedoms involved, this mistake
must be corrected through the appeals system
set up for that purpose and, as a last procedur-
al remedy, resort to judicial review (recurso de
revision). If the established system is thought to
be insufficient, the solution will consist in the
reform of the existing review mechanisms.'o
In relation to the reasoning in support
of pardons based on arguments aimed at the
reinsertion of the individual, I anticipated its
division to distinguish between: those reasons
that are based on the early achievement of
resocialization, before the end (temporal) of the
punishment was reached; and those that focus
106 FERRI, supra note 99, at 178-79.
107 VON LISZT, LEHRBUCH DES DEUTSCHEN STRAFRECHTS, supra
note 93, at 268.
10s See, e.g., L.E. CRIM. (B.O.E. 1882, 260) (Spain). This was
also the case with Royal Decree 41/2015, of October 6, on the
modification of the Procedure Criminal Law for the acceler-
ation of criminal justice and the strengthening of procedural
guarantees. (B.O.E. 2015, 239).
on the pardon as a reward or incentive for the
convict.
In the first subgroup, the constructions
have to be distinguished according to the tem-
poral stage in which the offender's resocializa-
tion was achieved in relation to the enforcement
of the sentence. In a scenario where resocial-
ization has been completed before the sen-
tence has been enforced, due to the excessive
lapse of time between the acts (not prescribed)
and the sentence, there would no longer be a
need for the subject to verify his re-education
in prison. In these cases, the judgement may or
may not have been delivered. When delivering
the judgement, the sentencing court has: i) the
mitigating circumstance of undue delay at his
disposal (CP Article 21.6); ii) the closing clause
set forth in CP Article 21.7; (iii) the general
rules that allow for its adjustment depending
on the offender's personal circumstances (CP
Article 66); or iv), if the requirements are met,
the suspended sentence (CP Articles 80 et seq.).
If social reinsertion had been achieved
after the judgement declaring an imprison-
ment sentence was delivered, two scenarios
should be distinguished: one in which the en-
forcement of the sentence has not yet begun
and the one in which said reintegration materi-
alizes during the sentence.
In the first of the scenarios described,
Bacigalupo Zapater advocates for the use of
pardons in cases where the convicted person
has completed his or her social reintegration in
the time between the commission of the crim-
inal act and the enforcement of the sentence
imposed.'09 However, I believe that nothing
would prevent the reform of Article 80 CP in
this sense, if it can be deemed necessary to ex-
"0 BACIGALUPO ZAPATER, DERECHO PENAL, supra note 69, at 25.
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tend and expand those cases where imprison-
ment may be suspended.
On the other hand, if the offender's
resocialization takes place during his impris-
onment, once the offender is inside the penal
institution and before the end of the sentence
being served, it is not necessary to resort to
pardons. Merkel" 0 , a defender of this particu-
lar argument, pointed out that institutions such
as parole would have displaced it. Additionally,
the Spanish prison system, based on the indi-
vidualization of treatment and the various se-
curity categories that allow the regime to be
adjusted to the preventive-special needs of the
subject (including the advancement of parole
as a prison benefit), would perfectly satisfy the
function assigned to pardons.
Finally, if the purpose is to use pardons
as an incentive or reward to achieve the offend-
er's resocialization with the aim of establishing
it as a maximum prison benefit, it should be
specified that according to Article 25 of the
Spanish Constitution, the said purpose should
not be understood as an exception but should
be applied to all the punishments to be served.
In the second of the scenarios described,
the existing prison regulation positively values
the offender's good behavior, allowing for the
individualized enforcement of punishments in
which the possibility of advancing parole is pro-
vided as a prison benefit, whose regime could
be legally extended, if deemed necessary. There-
fore, also in this area, pardons have been sur-
passed by institutions subject to predetermined
requirements, endowed with greater guarantees
and which are, in practice, less disturbing for the
convicted subject' and society itself
110 MERKEL, supra note 103, at 251.
. CONCEPCION ARENAL DE GARCIA CARRASCo, EL DERECHO DE
GRACIA: ANTE LA JUSTICIA; Y EL REO, EL PUEBLO Y EL VERDUGO
[THE RIGHT OF GRACE: BEFORE JUSTICE: THE INMATE, THE PEOPLE
In short, those who have approached
the study of the pardon assuming the start-
ing hypotheses of special prevention have re-
alized that, actually, this institution has lost its
importance in favor of other mechanisms.112
These instruments would impact not only at
the time of determining the penalty to be ap-
plied to the subject but, also the terms in which
the punishment hat is finally imposed must be
achieved. I refer to the introduction of mitigat-
ing circumstances ex lege, to the incorporation
of ranges in relation to the penological limits
associated with the definition of crimes,"3 to
the suspended sentence,"4 its replacement by
alternative penalties, conditional reduction, pa-
role,115 or the system of individualization of the
enforcement of the punishment."6
AND THE EXECUTIONER] 55-56, 117-118 (Madrid, 1893); Car-
men Navarro Villanueva, Notas acerca del indulto [Notes on
pardon], in 30 A&oS DE LA LEY DE AMNISTIA (1977-2007) [30
YEARS OF AMNESTY LAW (1977-2007)] 235-36 (Maria Jesus
Espuny I Tomas et al. eds., 2009).
112 JERONIMO GARCIA SAN MARTIN, LA SUSPENSION DE LA
EJECUCION Y SUSTITUCION DE LAS PENAS [THE SUSPENSION OF THE
EXECUTION AND SUBSTITUTION OF PENALTIES] 66-67 (2012).
113 von Liszt, Kriminalpolitische Aufgaben [I], supra note 94,
at 497; Franz von Liszt, Kriminalpolitische Aufgaben [III]
[Criminal Policy Tasks [III]], 10 ZEITSCHRIFT FUR DIE GESAMTE
STRAFRECHTSWISSENSCHAFT [J. OF ALL CRIM. Sc.] 51, 53 (1890).
114 DIEGO-MANUEL LuzoN PENA, MEDICION DE LA PENA Y SUSTI-
TUTIVOS PENALES (COLECCION DE CRIMINOLOGiA Y DERECHO PENAL)
[MEASUREMENT OF PENALTY AND CRIMINAL SUBSTITUTIONS (COL-
LECTION OF CRIMINOLOGY AND CRIMINAL LAW)] 93-95 (1979).
115 BACIGALUPO ZAPATER, DERECHO PENAL supra note 69, at 25;
DIMOULIS, DIE BEGNADIGUNG, supra note 17, at 421 26, 600;
LINDE PANIAGUA, AmNiSTIA, supra note 65, at 45; LuzoN PENA,
supra note 114, at 95-97; Santiago Mir Puig & Francisco
Mufioz Conde, Propuesta lternativa de la parte general del
c6digo penal del grupo parlamentario comunista [Alternative
proposal of the general part of the penal code of the com-
munist parliamentary group], in 18 CUADERNOS DE POLITICA
CRIMINAL [CRIM. POL'Y BOOKS] 609, 614 (1982); S.T.C., Nov. 2,
2015 (B.O.E., No. 296) (Spain).
"6 Ley Orghnica General Penitenciaria art. 72 (B.O.E. 1979,
239); Reglamento Penitenciario arts. 100-109 (B.O.E. 1996,
40); Maria del Puerto Solar Calvo, Elprincipio deflexibilidad
en el medio penitenciario [The principle offlexibility in the
penitentiary environment], 8912 DIARIo LA LEY [LAW NEWSPA-
PER] 1, 1-4 (2017).
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In this regard, in relation to parole
(similar, in its nature, to a prisoners subjective
right)," its indissolubility regarding the en-
forcement of the sentence has been pointed
out, given that it would soften the potentially
inflexible rigidity, improving legal guidelines
and allowing "to put an end to suffering, which
when it is not necessary, is unjust. "" This also
makes the pardon obsolete and outdated from
this perspective."9
D. CONCLUSIONS
According to the distinction assumed at
the beginning of this article between the nor-
mal scenarios and transitional contexts, the
study of the arguments aiming to support the
use of pardon by the diverse theories of justi-
fication of punishment reveals a dichotomous
solution.
In the transitional contexts, there is con-
sensus among academic opinion that pardons
can be seen as an irreplaceable tool to make the
enforcement of punishment flexible in order to
achieve social peace and harmony within the
so-called toolbox of transitional justice.12 0
However, in normal scenarios, pardons
have been surpassed by other institutions that
have absorbed the functions that were histor-
ically assigned to it. That means that the uses
that in practice had been granted to pardons
are met through the opportune corrections
"I Maria del Puerto Solar Calvo, La libertad condicional
antipenitenciaria [The anti-prison probation], 8873 DIARIo LA
LEY [LAW NEWSPAPER] 1, 1-2 (2016).
11 CADALSo, supra note 17, at 42.
11 DIMOULIS, Die Gnade, supra note 81, at 354.
120 JAVIER CHINCHON ALVAREZ, DERECHO INTERNACIONAL Y TRAN-
SICIONES A LA DEMOCRACIA Y LA PAZ [INTERNATIONAL LAW AND
TRANSITIONS To DEMOCRACY AND PEACE] 458-65, 522 (2007). A
different question, which goes beyond the limits of this analy-
sis, is the material scope that such a pardon must have and the
body that must grant it.
and reforms of the system whose deficiencies
were intended to be corrected through that in-
stitution: a more correct statutory definition of
punishable acts and their legal consequences;
an adequate application of the law by the judges
and the provision of a more complete appeals
system (including a potential improvement of
the judicial review regime recurso de revision-);
or specific institutions provided for in the law
(parole). Perhaps this effect on the inexorable
overcoming of pardons would precisely explain
the sharp decrease in the number of pardons
granted in Spain in the last ten years.121
121 In 2017, 26 pardons were granted; in 2018 (until April
8) that figure dropped to 9, which contrasts with the average
of 311 that Spain granted over the previous 10 years. Eva
Belmonte & David Cabo, Casi uno de cada cuatro indultos
concedidos en 201 7fue para condenados por corrupcidn
[Nearly one in every four pardons granted in 2017 were for
those convicted of corruption], PUBLICO, Apr. 9, 2018, https://
www.publico.es/espana/cuatro-indultos-concedidos-2017-con-
denados-corrupcion.html.
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